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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2312 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  MICHAEL RINALDI, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Crim. No. 3:98-cr-00294-002) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 23, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 11, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Rinaldi, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, has filed in this Court a 
pleading titled “Writ of Error,” which has been docketed as a petition for a writ of 
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651.  In this petition, Rinaldi asks this Court to direct the 
District Court to dismiss the indictment against him. 
 In 1999, Rinaldi was convicted of various drug trafficking and firearms charges 
and sentenced to 248 months’ incarceration.  We affirmed Rinaldi’s judgment on direct 
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appeal.  See United States v. Rinaldi, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000).  Rinaldi then 
unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 In June 2012, Rinaldi filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the 
indictment was defective because the Government had failed to allege a nexus to 
interstate commerce for his drug trafficking offenses.  As relief, he asked the District 
Court to reverse and vacate his conviction.  The District Court denied his motion, 
explaining (i) that Rinaldi should be proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after obtaining 
authorization from this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and (ii) that his 
motion to dismiss was untimely filed.  We declined to issue a certificate of appealability 
and summarily affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.  See United States v. Rinaldi, 
No. 12-2938 (order entered Dec. 28, 2012).  On May 8, 2013, Rinaldi filed the instant 
petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to have this Court direct the District Court to 
dismiss the indictment in his case because of the Government’s failure to allege the 
interstate commerce nexus. 
Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted only in extraordinary cases.  In re 
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To demonstrate that 
mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must demonstrate that “(1) no other adequate 
means exist to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is 
clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
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Rinaldi has not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ, 
as he is not asking us “to confine the [District Court] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”  In re 
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d at 378 (internal citation and quotation omitted).  
Here, he is attempting to appeal for a second time the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to dismiss the indictment, which he cannot do through a mandamus petition.  See 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (mandamus is not a substitute for 
appeal).  Instead, he could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari to review our December 28, 2012 order denying him relief.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
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 In any event, it is well settled, and Congress has explicitly noted, that drug trafficking 
activities affect interstate commerce.  See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (“[i]ncidents of the traffic 
which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local 
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect on interstate 
commerce”).  Moreover, federal drug trafficking statutes are valid exercises of Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105, 107 
(3d Cir. 1996).  Finally, to the extent that Rinaldi asserts that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction because of the alleged defects in the indictment, that argument was rejected 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 
